论文标题

无处可隐藏:生物识别技术和设备之间的跨模式身份泄漏

Nowhere to Hide: Cross-modal Identity Leakage between Biometrics and Devices

论文作者

Lu, Chris Xiaoxuan, Li, Yang, Xiangli, Yuanbo, Li, Zhengxiong

论文摘要

随着物联网(IoT)的好处(物联网)带来了潜在的隐私风险,因为数十亿个连接的设备被授予跟踪有关用户的信息并通过Internet向其他方进行通信。对手特别感兴趣的是用户身份,它在发射攻击中不断发挥重要作用。尽管对某种类型的物理生物识别技术或设备身份的暴露进行了广泛的研究,但在多模式传感环境中,双方泄漏的复合效应仍然未知。在这项工作中,我们探讨了在网络物理空间中复合身份泄漏的可行性,并揭示了共同存在的智能设备ID(例如,智能手机MAC地址)和物理生物识别技术(例如,面部/人声样本)是彼此的侧渠道。已经证明,我们的方法对野外的各种观察噪声具有鲁棒性,并且攻击者可以以几乎为零的分析工作来全面地介绍多维的受害者。关于不同生物识别技术和设备ID的两个现实世界实验表明,所提出的方法可以损害超过70 \%的设备ID,并同时收集纯度约94%的生物识别簇。

Along with the benefits of Internet of Things (IoT) come potential privacy risks, since billions of the connected devices are granted permission to track information about their users and communicate it to other parties over the Internet. Of particular interest to the adversary is the user identity which constantly plays an important role in launching attacks. While the exposure of a certain type of physical biometrics or device identity is extensively studied, the compound effect of leakage from both sides remains unknown in multi-modal sensing environments. In this work, we explore the feasibility of the compound identity leakage across cyber-physical spaces and unveil that co-located smart device IDs (e.g., smartphone MAC addresses) and physical biometrics (e.g., facial/vocal samples) are side channels to each other. It is demonstrated that our method is robust to various observation noise in the wild and an attacker can comprehensively profile victims in multi-dimension with nearly zero analysis effort. Two real-world experiments on different biometrics and device IDs show that the presented approach can compromise more than 70\% of device IDs and harvests multiple biometric clusters with ~94% purity at the same time.

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