论文标题
双向平台竞争收入和吞吐量
Duopolistic platform competition for revenue and throughput
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑在双面市场上运行的两个竞争平台，并以潜在的价格为其客户提供相同的服务。每个平台的目的是通过适当的服务来最大化其吞吐量或收入。我们假设客户对平台有偏好或忠诚，而工人自由职业者则可以自由使用这两个平台。假设用户之间产生的互动是使他们的总实用程序最大化，我们表明，对于忠诚度的每个价值，都存在纯粹的策略NASH平衡，用于吞吐量和收入竞争游戏并表征它。
We consider two competing platforms operating in a two-sided market and offering identical services to their customers at potentially different prices. The objective of each platform is to maximize its throughput or revenue by suitably pricing its services. We assume that customers have a preference or loyalty to the platforms while the workers freelance for the two platforms. Assuming that the resulting interaction between the users is such that their aggregate utility is maximized, we show that for each value of the loyalty, there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for both the throughput and revenue competition game and characterize it.
