论文标题
对分散归因的加密进行串谋攻击：分析和解决方案
Collusion Attacks on Decentralized Attributed-Based Encryption: Analyses and a Solution
论文作者
论文摘要
基于属性的加密（ABE）是一种以信息为中心的安全解决方案，它通过允许灵活，基于策略和基于内容的基于内容的访问控制，超越了点对点加密的传统限制，该访问受到了密码的强制。由于原始的安倍系统由单个机构管理，因此，几项努力使不同的安倍计划解决了托管问题，因此当局可以在其中发布秘密钥匙以解密所有密文。但是，分散的安倍（DABE）计划提出了勾结袭击的问题。在本文中，我们回顾了对DABE系统的两种现有类型的勾结攻击，并在当局和数据使用者之间引入了一种新型的勾结。我们表明，六个现有的DABE系统容易受到新引入的勾结，并提出了一个模型来确保其中一种DABE计划。
Attribute-based Encryption (ABE) is an information centric security solution that moves beyond traditional restrictions of point-to-point encryption by allowing for flexible, fine-grain policy-based and content-based access control that is cryptographically enforced. As the original ABE systems are managed by a single authority, several efforts have decentralized different ABE schemes to address the key escrow problem, where the authority can issue secret keys to itself to decrypt all the ciphertext. However, decentralized ABE (DABE) schemes raise the issue of collusion attacks. In this paper, we review two existing types of collusion attacks on DABE systems, and introduce a new type of collusion among authorities and data users. We show that six existing DABE systems are vulnerable to the newly introduced collusion and propose a model to secure one of the DABE schemes.
