论文标题
通过深厚的加强学习,隐私感知的时间序列数据共享
Privacy-Aware Time-Series Data Sharing with Deep Reinforcement Learning
论文作者
论文摘要
由于他们提供的许多新服务和应用程序,物联网(物联网)设备变得越来越流行。但是,除了许多好处外,它们还引起了隐私问题,因为他们与不受信任的第三方共享精细的时间序列用户数据。在这项工作中,我们研究了时间序列数据共享中的隐私性权衡(PUT)。现有的方法主要关注单个数据点;但是,时间序列数据的时间相关性引入了新的挑战。在当前时间保留隐私的方法可能会在痕量级别泄漏大量信息,因为对手可以利用跟踪中的时间相关性。我们考虑与不受信任的第三方共享用户真实数据序列的扭曲版本。我们通过用户的真实数据序列和共享版本之间的共同信息来衡量隐私泄漏。我们将两个序列之间的瞬时和平均变形视为实用性损失度量。为了解决依赖历史的共同信息最小化,我们将问题重新制定为马尔可夫决策过程(MDP),并使用异步参与者 - 批判性深度强化学习(RL)解决它。我们评估了在合成和Geolife GPS轨迹数据集对位置痕迹隐私中提出的解决方案的性能。对于后者,我们通过测试已发布的位置轨迹对对手网络的隐私来显示解决方案的有效性。
Internet of things (IoT) devices are becoming increasingly popular thanks to many new services and applications they offer. However, in addition to their many benefits, they raise privacy concerns since they share fine-grained time-series user data with untrusted third parties. In this work, we study the privacy-utility trade-off (PUT) in time-series data sharing. Existing approaches to PUT mainly focus on a single data point; however, temporal correlations in time-series data introduce new challenges. Methods that preserve the privacy for the current time may leak significant amount of information at the trace level as the adversary can exploit temporal correlations in a trace. We consider sharing the distorted version of a user's true data sequence with an untrusted third party. We measure the privacy leakage by the mutual information between the user's true data sequence and shared version. We consider both the instantaneous and average distortion between the two sequences, under a given distortion measure, as the utility loss metric. To tackle the history-dependent mutual information minimization, we reformulate the problem as a Markov decision process (MDP), and solve it using asynchronous actor-critic deep reinforcement learning (RL). We evaluate the performance of the proposed solution in location trace privacy on both synthetic and GeoLife GPS trajectory datasets. For the latter, we show the validity of our solution by testing the privacy of the released location trajectory against an adversary network.