论文标题
区块链生态系统中采矿池游戏的共识平衡框架
The Framework of Consensus Equilibria for Mining-Pool Games in Blockchain Ecosystems
论文作者
论文摘要
本文的目的是在区块链生态系统中建立共识均衡的一般框架，并在对稳定性的解释中建立稳定性的解释，以共识平衡的存在，与挖掘差距游戏行为的存在相关，通过使用一个new tyern in the BrokeSense Shere Shere Shere Specosystem in Broke Specosystem，通过将BockySy SpecySty进行循环的新概念而进行，该行为是通过将Brockchain Ecosystem进行的，该活动的含义，该概念是在区块链中，将其用于区块链的经验，该概念是通过block链的依据来进行的。通过在2008年应用了称为工作证明的关键共识，是支出，奖励机制和采矿能力的因素。 为了这样做，我们首先提出了如何制定开采泳池游戏的共识平衡的一般存在，然后用来解释在大块链共识的框架下存在共识均衡的意义上的间隙游戏稳定的比特币，然后我们将一般的付费付款在付款中，以付费量为开展的游戏中的一般付费游戏，这是一个普遍的付费。作为应用程序，建立了差距游戏共识平衡的一般存在结果，这不仅有助于我们在区块链生态系统的一般框架下声称GAP游戏的一般稳定性的存在，而且还使我们能够在矿业中造成的矿物差异范围内的挖掘案例造成的影响，从而使许多不同的现象与Seneed and Seneations一起进行了影响。我们关于针对区块链生态系统稳定性稳定性的解释的研究表明，共识平衡的概念对于共识经济学的基本理论的发展可能起重要作用。
The goal of this paper is to establish the general framework of consensus equilibria for Mining-Pool Games in Blockchain Ecosystems, and with the explanation for the stability of in terms of the existence of consensus equilibria related to mining gap game's behaviors by using one new concept called consensus games in Blockchain Ecosystems, here, the Blockchain ecosystem mainly means the economic activities by taking into the account of three types of different factors which are expenses, reward mechanism and mining power for the work on blockschain by applying the key consensus called Proof of Work due to Nakamoto in 2008. In order to do so, we first give an outline how the general existence of consensus equilibria for Mining Pool Games is formulated, and then used to explain the stable for Gap Games for Bitcoin in the sense by the existence of consensus equilibria under the framework of Blockchain consensus, we then establish a general existence result for consensus equilibria of general mining gap games by using the profit functions for miners as the payoffs in game theory. As applications, the general existence results for consensus equilibria of Gap games are established, which not only help us to claim the existence for the general stability for Gap games under the general framework of Blockchain ecosystems, but also allow us to illustrate a number of different phenomenon on the study of mining-pool games with possible impacts due to miners's gap behaviors with scenarios embedded n Bitcoin economics. Our study on the explanation for the stability of mining gap game for Blockchain ecosystems shows that the concept of consensus equilibria may play a important role for the development of fundamental theory for consensus economics.
