论文标题
量子键分配系统中的后置光作为安全漏洞
Backflash Light as a Security Vulnerability in Quantum Key Distribution Systems
论文作者
论文摘要
根据量子力学的基本规则，两个交流方可以生成和共享一个秘密随机密钥，该密钥可用于加密和解密通过不安全渠道发送的消息。此过程称为量子键分布（QKD）。与经典的加密方案相反，QKD系统的安全性不取决于特定数学问题的计算复杂性。但是，QKD系统可能会受到不同种类的攻击，利用构成系统组件的工程缺陷和技术缺陷。在这里，我们回顾QKD的安全漏洞。我们主要关注一种称为后空光线的特定效果，这可能是窃听攻击的来源。我们同样强调了量化后空发射的方法以及减轻这种效果的不同方法。
Based on the fundamental rules of quantum mechanics, two communicating parties can generate and share a secret random key that can be used to encrypt and decrypt messages sent over an insecure channel. This process is known as quantum key distribution (QKD). Contrary to classical encryption schemes, the security of a QKD system does not depend on the computational complexity of specific mathematical problems. However, QKD systems can be subject to different kinds of attacks, exploiting engineering and technical imperfections of the components forming the systems. Here, we review the security vulnerabilities of QKD. We mainly focus on a particular effect known as backflash light, which can be a source of eavesdropping attacks. We equally highlight the methods for quantifying backflash emission and the different ways to mitigate this effect.
