论文标题
关于无纠缠的量子识别
Concerning Quantum Identification Without Entanglement
论文作者
论文摘要
身份方案是互动协议，通常涉及两个方，一个供奉献者，他们想提供其身份和验证者的证据，他们检查了提供的证据并决定是否来自预期的供者。在本文中，我们对Zawadzki的量子身份身份验证的最新提案发表评论，并给出了Lo和Buhrman等人的理论不可能结果的具体攻击。更确切地说，我们表明，使用简单的战略对手确实可以获取有关共享识别秘密的不可忽略的信息。虽然[1]中未正式定义量子身份身份验证方案的安全性，但很明显，这种定义应该以某种方式暗示外部实体可能不会获得有关共享识别方案的信息（即使他积极参与在协议执行中注入消息，这在我们的攻击策略中没有假定）。
Identification schemes are interactive protocols typically involving two parties, a prover, who wants to provide evidence of his or her identity and a verifier, who checks the provided evidence and decide whether it comes or not from the intended prover. In this paper, we comment on a recent proposal for quantum identity authentication from Zawadzki, and give a concrete attack upholding theoretical impossibility results from Lo and Buhrman et al. More precisely, we show that using a simple strategyan adversary may indeed obtain non-negligible information on the shared identification secret. While the security of a quantum identity authentication scheme is not formally defined in [1], it is clear that such a definition should somehow imply that an external entity may gain no information on the shared identification scheme (even if he actively participates injecting messages in a protocol execution, which is not assumed in our attack strategy).
