论文标题
修改后的Schelling游戏
Modified Schelling Games
论文作者
论文摘要
我们介绍了一类改良的Schelling游戏，其中有不同类型的代理占据了位置图的节点；相同类型的代理是朋友，不同类型的代理是敌人。每个经纪人都是战略性的，并跳到图表的空节点，旨在最大化她的效用，定义为她在附近的朋友的比例与包括她自己在内的邻里大小。这与有关Schelling游戏的相关文献相反，该文献通常假设代理在计算其大小的同时被排除在她的邻里之外。我们的模型使公用事业功能能够捕获代理人宁愿与很多朋友而不是仅几个朋友在一起的情况，这一方面在以前的工作中被部分忽略。我们通过限制一般图表和有趣的特殊情况的无政府状态和稳定价格的价格，对在这种修改后的Schelling游戏中产生的（在）平衡效率的详细分析。我们的大多数结果都是紧密的，并利用了平衡的结构以及复杂的结构。
We introduce the class of modified Schelling games in which there are different types of agents who occupy the nodes of a location graph; agents of the same type are friends, and agents of different types are enemies. Every agent is strategic and jumps to empty nodes of the graph aiming to maximize her utility, defined as the ratio of her friends in her neighborhood over the neighborhood size including herself. This is in contrast to the related literature on Schelling games which typically assumes that an agent is excluded from her neighborhood whilst computing its size. Our model enables the utility function to capture likely cases where agents would rather be around a lot of friends instead of just a few, an aspect that was partially ignored in previous work. We provide a thorough analysis of the (in)efficiency of equilibria that arise in such modified Schelling games, by bounding the price of anarchy and price of stability for both general graphs and interesting special cases. Most of our results are tight and exploit the structure of equilibria as well as sophisticated constructions.
