论文标题
战略冲突背景下的文化进化模型
A model of cultural evolution in the context of strategic conflict
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑了在游戏理论框架中互动的个人中选择策略的文化进化模型。进化结合了对环境的个人学习（人口策略概况），繁殖，与获得知识的成功成正比以及将知识传播给下一代。得出了一个平均场类型方程式，该方程描述了文化特征分布的动态，从学习率，繁殖率和人口规模方面。我们为该方程式建立了最初的有限价值问题的全球适合性，并提供了几个示例，以说明某些古典游戏的文化进化过程。
We consider a model of cultural evolution for a strategy selection in a population of individuals who interact in a game theoretic framework. The evolution combines individual learning of the environment (population strategy profile), reproduction, proportional to the success of the acquired knowledge, and social transmission of the knowledge to the next generation. A mean-field type equation is derived that describes the dynamics of the distribution of cultural traits, in terms of the rate of learning, the reproduction rate and population size. We establish global well-posedness of the initial-boundary value problem for this equation and give several examples that illustrate the process of the cultural evolution for some classical games.
