论文标题
加权游戏对二元投票足够好吗？
Are weighted games sufficiently good for binary voting?
论文作者
论文摘要
立法委员会或股东大会中的二进制YES-no决定通常被仿照加权游戏。但是，有一个值得注意的例外。例如，根据《里斯本条约》，欧洲理事会的投票规则使用了更复杂的结构。在这里，我们要研究一个问题，如果我们从实际的角度损失了很大，如果我们将自己限制在加权游戏中。为此，我们调用了衡量成员在二进制决策委员会中影响的权力指数。更确切地说，我们将加权游戏的可实现的功率分布与合理的加权游戏超集的功率分布进行了比较。事实证明，偏差相对较小。
Binary yes-no decisions in a legislative committee or a shareholder meeting are commonly modeled as a weighted game. However, there are noteworthy exceptions. E.g., the voting rules of the European Council according to the Treaty of Lisbon use a more complicated construction. Here we want to study the question if we lose much from a practical point of view, if we restrict ourselves to weighted games. To this end, we invoke power indices that measure the influence of a member in binary decision committees. More precisely, we compare the achievable power distributions of weighted games with those from a reasonable superset of weighted games. It turns out that the deviation is relatively small.
