论文标题
设计稳定的选举：调查
Designing Stable Elections: A Survey
论文作者
论文摘要
我们调查针对第三方试图干扰的选举设计。例如，假设投票是在两个候选人之间的选举中进行的，然后每次投票都以很小的可能性随机改变，而与其他投票无关。无论投票的变化如何，都希望保持选举的结果相同。众所周知，与多数投票相比，由于投票腐败，美国选举学院制度的结果变化的可能性大约高出约5倍。实际上，Mossel，O'Donnell和Oleszkiewicz在2005年证明，多数投票方法对这种随机投票腐败最稳定，在每个人对选举影响很小的投票方法中。我们讨论了两个以上候选人之间选举的类似结果的最新进展。在这种情况下，多数应该对投票腐败最稳定。我们还调查了对抗性选举操作的结果（对手可以选择特定的投票以改变，也许是非随机方式），我们简要讨论了排名的选择投票方法（其中投票是候选人的排名清单）。
We survey the design of elections that are resilient to attempted interference by third parties. For example, suppose votes have been cast in an election between two candidates, and then each vote is randomly changed with a small probability, independently of the other votes. It is desirable to keep the outcome of the election the same, regardless of the changes to the votes. It is well known that the US electoral college system is about 5 times more likely to have a changed outcome due to vote corruption, when compared to a majority vote. In fact, Mossel, O'Donnell and Oleszkiewicz proved in 2005 that the majority voting method is most stable to this random vote corruption, among voting methods where each person has a small influence on the election. We discuss some recent progress on the analogous result for elections between more than two candidates. In this case, plurality should be most stable to corruption in votes. We also survey results on adversarial election manipulation (where an adversary can select particular votes to change, perhaps in a non-random way), and we briefly discuss ranked choice voting methods (where a vote is a ranked list of candidates).
