论文标题
多代理系统的动态任务分配问题的分散游戏理论控制
Decentralized Game-Theoretic Control for Dynamic Task Allocation Problems for Multi-Agent Systems
论文作者
论文摘要
我们为多代理系统的动态任务分配问题提出了一个分散的游戏理论框架。在我们的问题制定中，代理商的实用程序依赖于成功完成分配给他们的任务的奖励和成本。奖励反映了代理人完成其指定任务的可能性，而成本反映了完成这些任务所需的努力（这项工作取决于解决相应的最佳控制问题的解决方案）。本文考虑的任务分配问题对应于一个动态游戏，其解决方案与经典静态（或单次）游戏公式相反，其解决方案取决于代理的状态。我们提出了一种贪婪的解决方案方法，在这种方法中，代理人相互协商，根据反映其当前状态的任务实用程序的评估，找到了相互同意的（或单独理性的）任务分配配置文件。我们通过广泛的数值模拟来说明这项工作的主要思想。
We propose a decentralized game-theoretic framework for dynamic task allocation problems for multi-agent systems. In our problem formulation, the agents' utilities depend on both the rewards and the costs associated with the successful completion of the tasks assigned to them. The rewards reflect how likely is for the agents to accomplish their assigned tasks whereas the costs reflect the effort needed to complete these tasks (this effort is determined by the solution of corresponding optimal control problems). The task allocation problem considered herein corresponds to a dynamic game whose solution depends on the states of the agents in contrast with classic static (or single-act) game formulations. We propose a greedy solution approach in which the agents negotiate with each other to find a mutually agreeable (or individually rational) task assignment profile based on evaluations of the task utilities that reflect their current states. We illustrate the main ideas of this work by means of extensive numerical simulations.
