论文标题
无限二维渔民市场和可拖动的公平部门
Infinite-Dimensional Fisher Markets and Tractable Fair Division
论文作者
论文摘要
线性渔民市场是一种基本的经济模式,在公平部门以及大型互联网市场中应用。在$ n $买家和$ m $项目的有限维情况下,可以使用Eisenberg-Gale凸面计划计算市场均衡。本文由大规模的互联网广告和公平部门的应用程序进行,考虑到有限的买家和连续项目的线性渔民市场的概括。我们介绍了Eisenberg-Gale凸面程序的概括及其双重二元,这导致了Banach空间优化问题。我们确定了KKT型条件的最佳解决方案,强双重性以及必要性和充分性。所有这些属性都是通过非标准参数确定的,这些论点规定了对无限二维Banach空间优化双重性理论的局限性。此外,我们表明存在纯平衡分配,即项目空间的划分。当项目空间是一个封闭的间隔并且买家具有分段线性估值时,我们表明,艾森伯格 - 盖尔型凸面程序对无限二维分配可以重新校正为有限维二级凸锥程序,可以使用基于Priral Dual Dual Dual Dual Dual Promient Point Pointer Point Sotess进行有限的优化软件,以有效地解决该计划。根据我们的凸锥重新制定,我们开发了第一个实现帕累托最优性,嫉妒性和相称性的第一个多项式蛋糕切割算法。对于一般买家的估值或大量的买家,我们建议使用随机双平均值来计算市场均衡,该平均平均值可以找到近似平衡的价格,概率很高。最后,我们讨论了上述结果如何轻松扩展到准素化实用程序的情况。
Linear Fisher markets are a fundamental economic model with applications in fair division as well as large-scale Internet markets. In the finite-dimensional case of $n$ buyers and $m$ items, a market equilibrium can be computed using the Eisenberg-Gale convex program. Motivated by large-scale Internet advertising and fair division applications, this paper considers a generalization of a linear Fisher market where there is a finite set of buyers and a continuum of items. We introduce generalizations of the Eisenberg-Gale convex program and its dual to this infinite-dimensional setting, which leads to Banach-space optimization problems. We establish existence of optimal solutions, strong duality, as well as necessity and sufficiency of KKT-type conditions. All these properties are established via non-standard arguments, which circumvent the limitations of duality theory in optimization over infinite-dimensional Banach spaces. Furthermore, we show that there exists a pure equilibrium allocation, i.e., a division of the item space. When the item space is a closed interval and buyers have piecewise linear valuations, we show that the Eisenberg-Gale-type convex program over the infinite-dimensional allocations can be reformulated as a finite-dimensional convex conic program, which can be solved efficiently using off-the-shelf optimization software based on primal-dual interior-point methods. Based on our convex conic reformulation, we develop the first polynomial-time cake-cutting algorithm that achieves Pareto optimality, envy-freeness, and proportionality. For general buyer valuations or a very large number of buyers, we propose computing market equilibrium using stochastic dual averaging, which finds approximate equilibrium prices with high probability. Finally, we discuss how the above results easily extend to the case of quasilinear utilities.