论文标题
从计算假设中独立于设备的量子密钥分布
Device-independent quantum key distribution from computational assumptions
论文作者
论文摘要
在独立于设备的量子键分布（DIQKD）中，对手准备了由两个组件组成的设备，分布给爱丽丝和鲍勃，他们使用该设备来生成安全键。现有DIQKD方案的安全性是在设备的两个组件在协议执行过程中无法相互通信的假设。这称为diqkd中的无通信假设。在这里，我们展示了如何替换这一假设，这在实践中很难通过量子后加密术中的标准计算假设来实践：我们提供了一个协议，即使对手设备的组件可以交换任意量子通信，假设设备是计算界限的，则可以产生安全的密钥。重要的是，计算假设只需要在协议执行过程中保留 - 在协议末尾生成的密钥在理论上是像标准DIQKD协议中所致的。
In device-independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD), an adversary prepares a device consisting of two components, distributed to Alice and Bob, who use the device to generate a secure key. The security of existing DIQKD schemes holds under the assumption that the two components of the device cannot communicate with one another during the protocol execution. This is called the no-communication assumption in DIQKD. Here, we show how to replace this assumption, which can be hard to enforce in practice, by a standard computational assumption from post-quantum cryptography: we give a protocol that produces secure keys even when the components of an adversarial device can exchange arbitrary quantum communication, assuming the device is computationally bounded. Importantly, the computational assumption only needs to hold during the protocol execution -- the keys generated at the end of the protocol are information-theoretically secure as in standard DIQKD protocols.
