论文标题

电磁传感器和执行器对电动汽车的电动转换器的攻击

Electromagnetic Sensor and Actuator Attacks on Power Converters for Electric Vehicles

论文作者

Dayanikli, Gokcen Y., Hatch, Rees R., Gerdes, Ryan M., Wang, Hongjie, Zane, Regan

论文摘要

减轻电动汽车范围焦虑(即,是否可以及时依靠这种车辆行驶长距离)对于可持续运输至关重要。已经提出,在为内燃机加油的时间范围内可以快速充电(EV),可以快速充电(EV)充电(EV),以减轻这种担忧。这些充电器的关键组成部分是电源转换器的有效,正确的操作,这些电源转换器将AC转换为直流电源,否则将电源传递到车辆。这些转换器依靠传感器和致动信号的完整性。在这项工作中,最新的XFC转换器的操作在对抗条件下进行了评估,特别是针对有意的​​电磁干扰攻击(IEMI)。分析目标系统的目的是确定IEMI,即可能的弱点。电压和电流传感器输出和门控制信号。这项工作表明,在功率相对较低的情况下,对手能够操纵所需的电压和电流传感器输出,以确保转换器的正确操作。此外,在此类攻击的第一次攻击中,这表明可以操纵控制转换器开关的栅极信号,以造成灾难性的效果。即,攻击者有可能控制单个晶体管的开关状态,从而对转换器和相关系统造成无法弥补的损害。最后,提供了有关硬件设计人员减轻基于IEMI的攻击的对策。

Alleviating range anxiety for electric vehicles (i.e., whether such vehicles can be relied upon to travel long distances in a timely manner) is critical for sustainable transportation. Extremely fast charging (XFC), whereby electric vehicles (EV) can be quickly recharged in the time frame it takes to refuel an internal combustion engine, has been proposed to alleviate this concern. A critical component of these chargers is the efficient and proper operation of power converters that convert AC to DC power and otherwise regulate power delivery to vehicles. These converters rely on the integrity of sensor and actuation signals. In this work the operation of state-of-the art XFC converters is assessed in adversarial conditions, specifically against Intentional Electromagnetic Interference Attacks (IEMI). The targeted system is analyzed with the goal of determining possible weak points for IEMI, viz. voltage and current sensor outputs and gate control signals. This work demonstrates that, with relatively low power levels, an adversary is able to manipulate the voltage and current sensor outputs necessary to ensure the proper operation of the converters. Furthermore, in the first attack of its kind, it is shown that the gate signal that controls the converter switches can be manipulated, to catastrophic effect; i.e., it is possible for an attacker to control the switching state of individual transistors to cause irreparable damage to the converter and associated systems. Finally, a discussion of countermeasures for hardware designers to mitigate IEMI-based attacks is provided.

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