论文标题
大型游戏中的平衡收敛
Equilibrium convergence in large games
论文作者
论文摘要
本文介绍了（随机策略）大型游戏中NASH平衡对应的一般封闭图。特别是，我们表明，对于任何具有收敛序列的Fiinite-玩家游戏序列的大型游戏，可以通过大型游戏的NASH平衡引起的任何相应有限玩具游戏的NASH平衡序列的极限。这种结果超出了纯策略属性的封闭图属性的较早结果，用于多个方面的大型游戏中的NASH均衡对应。还提出了大型游戏中平衡选择的应用程序。
This paper presents a general closed graph property for (randomized strategy) Nash equilibrium correspondence in large games. In particular, we show that for any large game with a convergent sequence of fiinite-player games, the limit of any convergent sequence of Nash equilibria of the corresponding finite-player games can be induced by a Nash equilibrium of the large game. Such a result goes beyond earlier results on the closed graph property for pure strategy Nash equilibrium correspondence in large games in multiple aspects. An application on equilibrium selection in large games is also presented.
