论文标题
关于网络安全和网络风险校准的声誉游戏
A reputation game on cyber-security and cyber-risk calibration
论文作者
论文摘要
为了分析在网络安全环境中产生的战略互动，我们开发了一种新的声誉游戏模型，在该模型中，攻击者可以假装是普通用户，并且辩护人可能必须在某个时间点宣布攻击检测而不知道他是否已受到攻击。我们显示了马尔可夫策略中顺序平衡的存在和独特性，并明确表征了玩家的平衡策略。使用我们的模型，我们建议校准攻击概率的经验和理论方法，这是网络风险的重要因素。
To analyze strategic interactions arising in the cyber-security context, we develop a new reputation game model in which an attacker can pretend to be a normal user and a defender may have to announce attack detection at a certain point of time without knowing whether he has been attacked. We show the existence and uniqueness of sequential equilibrium in Markov strategies, and explicitly characterize the players' equilibrium strategies. Using our model, we suggest empirical and theoretical ways of calibrating the attack probability, which is an important element of cyber-risks.
