论文标题
空气网络：从空调计算机生成秘密Wi-Fi信号
AIR-FI: Generating Covert Wi-Fi Signals from Air-Gapped Computers
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中，我们表明攻击者可以通过Wi-Fi信号从气动计算机中渗透数据。折衷的气动计算机中的恶意软件可以在Wi-Fi频带中产生信号。信号是通过内存总线生成的 - 不需要特殊的硬件。敏感的数据可以在信号顶部进行调制并秘密渗透。我们表明，附近有Wi-Fi的设备（例如，智能手机，笔记本电脑，IoT设备）可以拦截这些信号，对其进行解码，并通过Internet将其发送给攻击者。为了提取信号，我们利用Wi-Fi芯片暴露的物理层信息。我们实施发射器和接收器，并讨论设计注意事项和实现细节。我们根据带宽和距离评估此秘密通道，并提供一组对策。我们的评估表明，可以将数据从空地计算机彻底渗透到附近的Wi-Fi接收器，该接收器的距离为几米。
In this paper, we show that attackers can exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers via Wi-Fi signals. Malware in a compromised air-gapped computer can generate signals in the Wi-Fi frequency bands. The signals are generated through the memory buses - no special hardware is required. Sensitive data can be modulated and secretly exfiltrated on top of the signals. We show that nearby Wi-Fi capable devices (e.g., smartphones, laptops, IoT devices) can intercept these signals, decode them, and send them to the attacker over the Internet. To extract the signals, we utilize the physical layer information exposed by the Wi-Fi chips. We implement the transmitter and receiver and discuss design considerations and implementation details. We evaluate this covert channel in terms of bandwidth and distance and present a set of countermeasures. Our evaluation shows that data can be exfiltrated from air-gapped computers to nearby Wi-Fi receivers located a distance of several meters away.
