论文标题
公共利益的强大私人供应
Robust Private Supply of a Public Good
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究了相关私人价值环境中委托人向一组代理商出售公共物品的机理设计问题。我们假设本金只知道代理值的期望，但不知道值的共同分布。本金通过与已知期望一致的联合分布的最差预期收入来评估一种机制。我们表征了Maxmin公共良好机制在占主导地位的激励和事前的兼容性和事前的单独理性机制以及特殊的$ n $ a $ agent（$ n> 2 $）案件中。
We study the mechanism design problem of selling a public good to a group of agents by a principal in the correlated private value environment. We assume the principal only knows the expectations of the agents' values, but does not know the joint distribution of the values. The principal evaluates a mechanism by the worst-case expected revenue over joint distributions that are consistent with the known expectations. We characterize maxmin public good mechanisms among dominant-strategy incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational mechanisms for the two-agent case and for a special $N$-agent ($N>2$) case.
