论文标题
公平个性化定价的监管工具
Regulatory Instruments for Fair Personalized Pricing
论文作者
论文摘要
个性化定价是一种商业策略,可以根据其特征和行为向单个消费者收取不同的价格。由于越来越多的高颗粒状消费者数据可用,如今在许多行业中已成为普遍的做法。个性化定价的歧视性质引发了政策制定者和学者之间有关如何设计监管政策以平衡市场效率和公平性的激烈辩论。在本文中,我们提出了两种合理的政策工具,即限制个性化价格或其比率的范围。我们调查了根据监管限制的垄断利润最大化垄断以及将其强加于消费者盈余,生产者盈余和社会福利的影响的最佳定价策略。从理论上讲,我们证明,两种建议的约束都可以帮助消费者盈余和生产者盈余平衡,而牺牲了共同需求分布的总盈余,例如统一,逻辑和指数分布。模拟和实际数据集的实验证明了这些理论结果的正确性。我们的发现和见解阐明了数字时代日益垄断业务的监管政策设计。
Personalized pricing is a business strategy to charge different prices to individual consumers based on their characteristics and behaviors. It has become common practice in many industries nowadays due to the availability of a growing amount of high granular consumer data. The discriminatory nature of personalized pricing has triggered heated debates among policymakers and academics on how to design regulation policies to balance market efficiency and equity. In this paper, we propose two sound policy instruments, i.e., capping the range of the personalized prices or their ratios. We investigate the optimal pricing strategy of a profit-maximizing monopoly under both regulatory constraints and the impact of imposing them on consumer surplus, producer surplus, and social welfare. We theoretically prove that both proposed constraints can help balance consumer surplus and producer surplus at the expense of total surplus for common demand distributions, such as uniform, logistic, and exponential distributions. Experiments on both simulation and real-world datasets demonstrate the correctness of these theoretical results. Our findings and insights shed light on regulatory policy design for the increasingly monopolized business in the digital era.