论文标题
重新访问Dunn-Belnap逻辑
Revisiting the Dunn-Belnap logic
论文作者
论文摘要
在目前的工作中，我介绍了一种基于给定代理商对邓恩（Dunn）和贝尔纳普（Belnap）的一级学位启发的逻辑学会所接受的认知和拒绝认知态度（$ \ mathbf {e} $）。与最初由$ \ mathbf {e} $采用的认知情况相反，认知态度与真实价值不一致，它们似乎更合适地适用于打算考虑“命题的信息内容”的逻辑，“被认为是真实的”和命题的命题。在分析了与拟议语义相关的一些逻辑之后，我们介绍了逻辑$ \ mathbf {e}^b $，其基本需要的关系 - $ b $ entailment-能够表达几种涉及认知态度和拒绝的认知态度。还提供了$ \ mathbf {e}^b $的声音和完整的演算。
In the present work I introduce a semantics based on the cognitive attitudes of acception and rejection entertained by a given society of agents for logics inspired on Dunn and Belnap's First Degree Entailment ($\mathbf{E}$). In contrast to the epistemic situations originally employed by $\mathbf{E}$, the cognitive attitudes do not coincide with truth-values and they seem more suitable to logics that intend to consider the informational content of propositions "said to be true" as well as of propositions "said to be false" as determinant of the notion of logical validity. After analyzing some logics associated to the proposed semantics, we introduce the logic $\mathbf{E}^B$, whose underlying entailment relation -- the $B$-entailment -- is able to express several kinds of reasoning involving the cognitive attitudes of acceptance and rejection. A sound and complete sequent calculus for $\mathbf{E}^B$ is also presented.
