论文标题
防止有安全PMU的协调网络物理攻击下的停电
Preventing Outages under Coordinated Cyber-Physical Attack with Secured PMUs
论文作者
论文摘要
由于协调的网络物理攻击(CCPA)的潜在严重后果,防御的设计引起了人们的重大关注。一种流行的方法是通过确保现有传感器或部署有担保的PMU来消除攻击的存在。在这项工作中,我们通过降低防御目标从消除攻击到预防中断并减少所需的PMU数量来改善这种方法。为此,我们将DC功率流模型下的PMU放在预防停电(PPOP)中的问题作为三级非线性优化问题,并将其转换为双层混合组合线线性编程(MILP)问题。然后,我们提出了一个交替的优化框架来通过迭代添加约束来解决PPOP,为此我们开发了两种约束生成算法。此外,对于大型网格,我们提出了一种多项式启发式算法以获得次优溶液。接下来,我们扩展解决方案以在交流电流模型下实现防御目标。最后,我们评估了IEEE 30总线,57个总线,118个总线和300个总线系统的算法,这证明了所提出的方法在大大减少了所需的PMU数量方面的潜力。
Due to the potentially severe consequences of coordinated cyber-physical attacks (CCPA), the design of defenses has gained significant attention. A popular approach is to eliminate the existence of attacks by either securing existing sensors or deploying secured PMUs. In this work, we improve this approach by lowering the defense target from eliminating attacks to preventing outages and reducing the required number of PMUs. To this end, we formulate the problem of PMU Placement for Outage Prevention (PPOP) under DC power flow model as a tri-level non-linear optimization problem and transform it into a bi-level mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) problem. Then, we propose an alternating optimization framework to solve PPOP by iteratively adding constraints, for which we develop two constraint generation algorithms. In addition, for large-scale grids, we propose a polynomial-time heuristic algorithm to obtain suboptimal solutions. Next, we extend our solution to achieve the defense goal under AC power flow model. Finally, we evaluate our algorithm on IEEE 30-bus, 57-bus, 118-bus, and 300-bus systems, which demonstrates the potential of the proposed approach in greatly reducing the required number of PMUs.