论文标题
策略性和比例的分段统一偏好部门
Strategyproof and Proportional Chore Division for Piecewise Uniform Preferences
论文作者
论文摘要
琐事部门是在许多玩家中相当分裂的一些分裂，不良的坏事，例如一组家务。每个玩家都有自己的杂务估值，必须满足他们的收到的份额不超过其公平份额。在本文中，我考虑了策略防护杂货部门的问题，在该问题中，算法必须确保每个玩家无法从错误代表自己的位置中受益。我提出了一种算法，该算法针对任何数量的分段均匀估值功能，对任何数量的玩家执行比例和战略性的琐事部门。
Chore division is the problem of fairly dividing some divisible, undesirable bad, such as a set of chores, among a number of players. Each player has their own valuation of the chores, and must be satisfied they did not receive more than their fair share. In this paper, I consider the problem of strategyproof chore division, in which the algorithm must ensure that each player cannot benefit from mis-representing their position. I present an algorithm that performs proportional and strategyproof chore division for any number of players given piecewise uniform valuation functions.
