论文标题
在能源市场中用于基于激励的需求响应的Stackelberg游戏
A Stackelberg game for incentive-based demand response in energy markets
论文作者
论文摘要
在现代建筑物中，可再生能源生成器和存储设备正在蔓延，因此用户在电网中的作用正在从被动转移到主动。我们设计了一种需求响应计划，该计划利用了Posumers的灵活性为主要电网提供辅助服务。我们提出了一个分层方案，以协调分配系统操作员与智能生产商社区之间的交互。该框架从基于价格和基于激励的方案中继承了特征，并保留了两者的优势。我们将这个问题作为stackelberg游戏，作为追随者，分配系统运营商作为领导者。我们通过KKT重新制定解决了由此产生的双层优化程序，证明了与局部Stackelberg平衡的存在和收敛性。最后，我们提供数值模拟，以证实我们对拟议框架的好处的主张。
In modern buildings renewable energy generators and storage devices are spreading, and consequently the role of the users in the power grid is shifting from passive to active. We design a demand response scheme that exploits the prosumers' flexibility to provide ancillary services to the main grid. We propose a hierarchical scheme to coordinate the interactions between the distribution system operator and a community of smart prosumers. The framework inherits characteristics from price-based and incentive-based schemes and it retains the advantages of both. We cast the problem as a Stackelberg game with the prosumers as followers and the distribution system operator as leader. We solve the resulting bilevel optimization program via a KKT reformulation, proving the existence and the convergence to a local Stackelberg equilibrium. Finally, we provide numerical simulations to corroborate our claims on the benefits of the proposed framework.
