论文标题
激励目标群体的比赛
Contests to Incentivize a Target Group
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究如何通过等级分配竞赛在不完整信息的情况下激励目标群中的代理，以在不完整的信息中产生更高的产出。我们描述了一个对称贝叶斯 - 具有两种基于排名的奖品的竞赛：奖品：仅适用于目标群体中的代理人的奖品；每个人都可以获得的奖品。我们还将这种均衡表征专门针对两个重要的子案例：（i）在授予奖品时没有歧视的竞赛，即只有所有人都可以获得的奖品； （ii）为小组提供奖品配额的竞赛，每个小组只能争夺自己的份额奖品。对于这些模型，我们还研究了竞赛的特性，该特性最大程度地提高了目标组中代理的预期总产出。
We study how to incentivize agents in a target group to produce a higher output in the context of incomplete information, by means of rank-order allocation contests. We describe a symmetric Bayes--Nash equilibrium for contests that have two types of rank-based prizes: prizes that are accessible only to the agents in the target group; prizes that are accessible to everyone. We also specialize this equilibrium characterization to two important sub-cases: (i) contests that do not discriminate while awarding the prizes, i.e., only have prizes that are accessible to everyone; (ii) contests that have prize quotas for the groups, and each group can compete only for prizes in their share. For these models, we also study the properties of the contest that maximizes the expected total output by the agents in the target group.
