论文标题
最佳分级比赛
Optimal grading contests
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究具有私人能力的代理商之间的努力最大化评分方案的设计。假设代理商从其等级揭示其能力的信息中获得价值，我们发现更有用的评分方案会引起更具竞争力的比赛。在比赛框架中，我们研究了操纵个人奖品并增加竞争对预期努力的影响，从而确定这些转变可能鼓励或不鼓励努力的能力分配和成本功能的条件。我们的结果表明，当高度能力的代理很可能会妨碍当这种代理不太可能的情况下，更有用的评分方案鼓励努力。
We study the design of effort-maximizing grading schemes between agents with private abilities. Assuming agents derive value from the information their grade reveals about their ability, we find that more informative grading schemes induce more competitive contests. In the contest framework, we investigate the effect of manipulating individual prizes and increasing competition on expected effort, identifying conditions on ability distributions and cost functions under which these transformations may encourage or discourage effort. Our results suggest that more informative grading schemes encourage effort when agents of moderate ability are highly likely, and discourage effort when such agents are unlikely.
