论文标题

NMA:具有外部性的神经多槽拍卖

NMA: Neural Multi-slot Auctions with Externalities for Online Advertising

论文作者

Liao, Guogang, Li, Xuejian, Wang, Ze, Yang, Fan, Guan, Muzhi, Zhu, Bingqi, Wang, Yongkang, Wang, Xingxing, Wang, Dong

论文摘要

由拍卖推动的在线广告为社交网络服务和电子商务平台带来了数十亿美元的收入。对于广告商来说,GSP拍卖非常简单易懂,几乎已成为行业中广告拍卖机制的基准。但是,大多数基于GSP的工业实践都认为用户点击仅依赖于广告本身,该广告本身忽略了外部项目的效果,称为外部性。最近,DNA试图在某种程度上升级具有深层神经网络的GSP,并模拟局部外部性。但是,它仅考虑拍卖中的设定级别上下文,而忽略了AD的顺序和显示位置,这仍然是次优的。尽管基于VCG的多槽拍卖(例如VCG,WVCG)在理论上可以建模全球外部性(例如,广告的顺序和位置等),但它们缺乏收入和社会福利的有效平衡。在本文中,我们提出了名为Neural Multi-Slot拍卖(NMA)的新型拍卖机制,以应对上述挑战。具体而言,我们使用上下文感知的列表预测模块有效地对全球外部性进行建模,以实现更好的性能。我们设计了一个列表深度排名模块,以确保端到端学习中的激励兼容性。此外,我们建议社会福利的辅助损失,以有效地减少社会福利的下降,同时最大化收入。离线大规模数据集和在线A/B测试的实验结果表明,与其他现有的拍卖机制(即GSP,DNA,WVCG)相比,NMA在工业实践中获得了更高的收入,而我们在Meituan食品交付平台上成功地部署了NMA。

Online advertising driven by auctions brings billions of dollars in revenue for social networking services and e-commerce platforms. GSP auctions, which are simple and easy to understand for advertisers, have almost become the benchmark for ad auction mechanisms in the industry. However, most GSP-based industrial practices assume that the user click only relies on the ad itself, which overlook the effect of external items, referred to as externalities. Recently, DNA has attempted to upgrade GSP with deep neural networks and models local externalities to some extent. However, it only considers set-level contexts from auctions and ignores the order and displayed position of ads, which is still suboptimal. Although VCG-based multi-slot auctions (e.g., VCG, WVCG) make it theoretically possible to model global externalities (e.g., the order and positions of ads and so on), they lack an efficient balance of both revenue and social welfare. In this paper, we propose novel auction mechanisms named Neural Multi-slot Auctions (NMA) to tackle the above-mentioned challenges. Specifically, we model the global externalities effectively with a context-aware list-wise prediction module to achieve better performance. We design a list-wise deep rank module to guarantee incentive compatibility in end-to-end learning. Furthermore, we propose an auxiliary loss for social welfare to effectively reduce the decline of social welfare while maximizing revenue. Experiment results on both offline large-scale datasets and online A/B tests demonstrate that NMA obtains higher revenue with balanced social welfare than other existing auction mechanisms (i.e., GSP, DNA, WVCG) in industrial practice, and we have successfully deployed NMA on Meituan food delivery platform.

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