论文标题
与无点信息消费者的内容过滤
Content Filtering with Inattentive Information Consumers
论文作者
论文摘要
我们开发了一个内容过滤的模型作为过滤器和内容消费者之间的游戏，后者会在其中征收检查内容的信息成本。激励的例子包括审查错误信息，垃圾邮件/网络钓鱼过滤和推荐系统。当攻击者是外源性的时，我们表明提高过滤器的质量会弱地改善，但对均衡收益没有影响，直到过滤器变得足够准确。此外，如果过滤器未内化信息成本，则其缺乏承诺能力可能会使它变得无用并导致效率低下的结果。当攻击者还具有战略意义时，过滤质量的改进有时可能会降低平衡收益。
We develop a model of content filtering as a game between the filter and the content consumer, where the latter incurs information costs for examining the content. Motivating examples include censoring misinformation, spam/phish filtering, and recommender systems. When the attacker is exogenous, we show that improving the filter's quality is weakly Pareto improving, but has no impact on equilibrium payoffs until the filter becomes sufficiently accurate. Further, if the filter does not internalize the information costs, its lack of commitment power may render it useless and lead to inefficient outcomes. When the attacker is also strategic, improvements to filter quality may sometimes decrease equilibrium payoffs.
