论文标题
金融网络游戏中的高级和最少的清算
Seniorities and Minimal Clearing in Financial Network Games
论文作者
论文摘要
金融网络游戏模型付款激励措施在网络负债的背景下。在本文中，我们将对金融网络中的激励措施的理解提高了两个重要的方向：最少的清算（例如，由于付款的顺序执行）和高级（即债务合同的优先级）。我们区分内源或外源选择的优先级。对于内源性优先级和标准（最大）清除，游戏表现出弱的无效的联盟形式。存在强大的平衡，可以在多项式偏差数之后达到。此外，有一个强大的平衡，非常适合各种社会福利功能。相比之下，对于最少的清除，有一些游戏，即使对于标准功利主义社会福利，也不存在最佳策略概况。也许令人惊讶的是，仍然存在强大的平衡，对于多种偏差数量后，可以达到各种策略。相反，对于外源优先级，可能不存在平衡，而平衡的存在是NP-HARD，以决定最小和最大清除。
Financial network games model payment incentives in the context of networked liabilities. In this paper, we advance the understanding of incentives in financial networks in two important directions: minimal clearing (arising, e.g., as a result of sequential execution of payments) and seniorities (i.e., priorities over debt contracts). We distinguish between priorities that are chosen endogenously or exogenously. For endogenous priorities and standard (maximal) clearing, the games exhibit a coalitional form of weak acyclicity. A strong equilibrium exists and can be reached after a polynomial number of deviations. Moreover, there is a strong equilibrium that is optimal for a wide variety of social welfare functions. In contrast, for minimal clearing there are games in which no optimal strategy profile exists, even for standard utilitarian social welfare. Perhaps surprisingly, a strong equilibrium still exists and, for a wide range of strategies, can be reached after a polynomial number of deviations. In contrast, for exogenous priorities, equilibria can be absent and equilibrium existence is NP-hard to decide, for both minimal and maximal clearing.
