论文标题
理性代理如何在流行病中起作用？
How does a Rational Agent Act in an Epidemic?
论文作者
论文摘要
大人来说，疾病的演变是集中式规划师的自上而下政策措施的函数，以及大量异构人群中个体代理人的自我利益决定（在社会上活跃）。本文关注的是基于平均场型最佳控制模型理解后者。具体而言，该模型用于研究部分信息对代理商决策的作用，并研究大量代理商对病毒在人群中传播的这种决定的影响。动机来自Covid-19病毒的预症状和无症状扩散，其中药物不知不觉地传播了该病毒。我们表明，即使在具有完全理性的药物的环境中，有关病毒状态的信息有限也可能导致流行病的增长。
Evolution of disease in a large population is a function of the top-down policy measures from a centralized planner, as well as the self-interested decisions (to be socially active) of individual agents in a large heterogeneous population. This paper is concerned with understanding the latter based on a mean-field type optimal control model. Specifically, the model is used to investigate the role of partial information on an agent's decision-making, and study the impact of such decisions by a large number of agents on the spread of the virus in the population. The motivation comes from the presymptomatic and asymptomatic spread of the COVID-19 virus where an agent unwittingly spreads the virus. We show that even in a setting with fully rational agents, limited information on the viral state can result in an epidemic growth.
