论文标题
网络限制的能源市场中的平衡
Equilibria in Network Constrained Energy Markets
论文作者
论文摘要
我们研究了一个由生产商组成的能源市场，他们竞争为不同市场提供能源，并希望最大化其利润。能源市场是由代表受约束功率网络的图表建模的，其中节点代表市场，链接是具有有限容量连接的物理线路。生产商在这样的网络上与称为市政机构（称为市政机构）一起在这样的网络上玩网络的欧司诺（Cournot）游戏，该游戏通过受约束的电力网络促进了地理上分开的市场之间的贸易，并旨在最大化某些福利功能。我们首先证明了一个总体结果，该结果将做市商的最佳行动与电力网络上强制执行的能力限制联系起来。在温和的假设下，我们研究了纳什均衡的存在和独特性，并利用了我们的一般结果，以证明电力网络中的容量瓶颈与被饱和线路分离的不同市场之间价格差异的出现之间存在联系，这是一种在实际电力网络中经常观察到的现象。
We study an energy market composed of producers who compete to supply energy to different markets and want to maximize their profits. The energy market is modeled by a graph representing a constrained power network where nodes represent the markets and links are the physical lines with a finite capacity connecting them. Producers play a networked Cournot game on such a network together with a centralized authority, called market maker, that facilitates the trade between geographically separate markets via the constrained power network and aims to maximize a certain welfare function. We first prove a general result that links the optimal action of the market maker with the capacity constraint enforced on the power network. Under mild assumptions, we study the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria and exploit our general result to prove a connection between capacity bottlenecks in the power network and the emergence of price differences between different markets that are separated by saturated lines, a phenomenon that is often observed in real power networks.
