论文标题
功能认识论“无效”戴森的扰动理论反驳
Functional Epistemology "Nullifies" Dyson's Rebuttal of Perturbation Theory
论文作者
论文摘要
功能认识论是关于使用方法和程序品种访问功能对象的方法。并非所有这些手段都可以同样能够以所需的一致性和解决方案来重现这些功能。戴森反对以激进形式的量子场理论术语的扰动扩展（戴森从未追求）的论点，是认识论的一个例子。
Functional epistemology is about ways to access functional objects by using varieties of methods and procedures. Not all such means are equally capable of reproducing these functions in the desired consistency and resolution. Dyson's argument against the perturbative expansion of quantum field theoretic terms, in a radical form (never pursued by Dyson), is an example of epistemology taken as ontology.
