论文标题
与平均野外游戏范式的流行病传播的社会结构描述
A social structure description of epidemics propagation with the mean field game paradigm
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑通过具有社会结构的爵士隔间模型的平均现场游戏版本的传染病传播，其中个人按年龄级分组并在不同的环境中互动。在我们的游戏理论方法中，如果流行病过于强大，个人可以选择限制他们的接触，但是这项努力却带来了社会成本。我们进一步比较以这种方式获得的NASH平衡与如果仁慈的中央计划者可以决定每个人的策略以及更现实的情况，那将获得的NASH平衡与社会最佳的最佳选择，以及通过诸如锁定之类的社会政策达到此最佳的近似值的情况。
We consider the spread of infectious diseases through a Mean Field Game version of a SIR compartmental model with social structure, in which individuals are grouped by their age class and interact together in different settings. In our game theoretical approach, individuals can choose to limit their contacts if the epidemic is too virulent, but this effort comes with a social cost. We further compare the Nash equilibrium obtained in this way with the societal optimum that would be obtained if a benevolent central planner could decide of the strategy of each individual, as well as to the more realistic situation where an approximation of this optimum is reached through social policies such as lockdown.
