论文标题
私人信息获取和抢先：战略性瓦尔德问题
Private Information Acquisition and Preemption: a Strategic Wald Problem
论文作者
论文摘要
本文研究了具有回报外部性的动态信息采集模型。在采取安全或冒险的行动之前，两名玩家可以获取有关未知状态的昂贵信息。信息和采取的动作都是私人的。第一个采取风险行动的球员具有优势，但是冒险行动是否有利可图取决于国家。玩家面临第一和正确之间的权衡。在平衡中，对于不同的先验，存在三种随机化：当玩家悲观时，他们会随机进入竞争；当玩家不太悲观时，他们会获取信息，然后随机停止；当玩家相对乐观时，他们会随机采取行动而无需获取信息。
This paper studies a dynamic information acquisition model with payoff externalities. Two players can acquire costly information about an unknown state before taking a safe or risky action. Both information and the action taken are private. The first player to take the risky action has an advantage but whether the risky action is profitable depends on the state. The players face the tradeoff between being first and being right. In equilibrium, for different priors, there exist three kinds of randomisation: when the players are pessimistic, they enter the competition randomly; when the players are less pessimistic, they acquire information and then randomly stop; when the players are relatively optimistic, they randomly take an action without acquiring information.
