论文标题
回顾特征函数形式中游戏的核心：一些新的公理化结果
A look back at the core of games in characteristic function form: some new axiomatization results
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中，我们提供了三个新的结果，以特征功能形式的游戏核心（不一定具有可转让的实用程序）来遵守无害条件（该单独理性的回报向量是有限的）。这项练习的一种新颖性是，我们的领域是此类游戏的{\ em整个}类：即，不需要诸如“非水平”或“平衡”之类的限制。
In this paper we provide three new results axiomatizing the core of games in characteristic function form (not necessarily having transferable utility) obeying an innocuous condition (that the set of individually rational pay-off vectors is bounded). One novelty of this exercise is that our domain is the {\em entire} class of such games: i.e., restrictions like "non-levelness" or "balancedness" are not required.
