论文标题
政府可以强迫解密吗？不信任 - 验证
Can the Government Compel Decryption? Don't Trust -- Verify
论文作者
论文摘要
如果法院知道受访者知道设备的密码，法院是否可以强迫被告将密码输入设备？在这项工作中，我们提出了一种新的方法，以解决Fisher v Us的定义学说，以控制这个问题的答案。这项工作的圣杯将是一个框架，用于推理政府是否已经知道任何行动中隐含的证词。在本文中，我们尝试一些更狭窄的东西。我们介绍了一个框架，用于指定所有隐式证词的作用，从而建设性地结论。我们的方法集中在将举证责任放在政府上，以证明这不是“依靠被告人的真相”。 在原始法律分析并使用精确的计算机科学形式主义的基础上，我们建议证明性作为描述强迫行为的新中心概念。我们还提供一种语言，说明强迫行动是否有意义地要求被告以“与政府的期望目标一样好”的方式表现。然后，我们应用定义来分析几种加密原始图的强制性，包括解密，多因素身份验证，承诺方案和哈希功能。特别是，我们的框架在加密方案是否认的情况下，关于强迫解密的新结论：政府可以强迫，但受访者可以自由使用她选择的任何密码。
If a court knows that a respondent knows the password to a device, can the court compel the respondent to enter that password into the device? In this work, we propose a new approach to the foregone conclusion doctrine from Fisher v US that governs the answer to this question. The Holy Grail of this line of work would be a framework for reasoning about whether the testimony implicit in any action is already known to the government. In this paper we attempt something narrower. We introduce a framework for specifying actions for which all implicit testimony is, constructively, a foregone conclusion. Our approach is centered around placing the burden of proof on the government to demonstrate that it is not "rely[ing] on the truthtelling" of the respondent. Building on original legal analysis and using precise computer science formalisms, we propose demonstrability as a new central concept for describing compelled acts. We additionally provide a language for whether a compelled action meaningfully entails the respondent to perform in a manner that is 'as good as' the government's desired goal. Then, we apply our definitions to analyze the compellability of several cryptographic primitives including decryption, multifactor authentication, commitment schemes, and hash functions. In particular, our framework reaches a novel conclusion about compelled decryption in the setting that the encryption scheme is deniable: the government can compel but the respondent is free to use any password of her choice.
