论文标题
在对手的情况下，多代理系统的最佳沟通和控制策略
Optimal Communication and Control Strategies for a Multi-Agent System in the Presence of an Adversary
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑了一个多代理系统，其中一个分散的代理团队在对手存在下控制随机系统。代理商可以在每次策略性地决定是否彼此共享其私人信息，而不是致力于固定信息共享协议。代理人每当相互交流时就会产生成本，而对手可能会窃听他们的交流。因此，团队中的代理商必须有效地互相协调，同时对对手的恶意行为有强大的态度。我们将团队与对手之间的这种互动建模为随机零和游戏，该游戏的目标是将成本降至最低，而对手则旨在最大化成本。根据对对手能力的一些假设，我们表征了团队的最小控制和交流策略。我们通过几个结构性结果来补充这种表征，这些结构结果可以使Min-Max策略的计算更具处理方式。
We consider a multi-agent system in which a decentralized team of agents controls a stochastic system in the presence of an adversary. Instead of committing to a fixed information sharing protocol, the agents can strategically decide at each time whether to share their private information with each other or not. The agents incur a cost whenever they communicate with each other and the adversary may eavesdrop on their communication. Thus, the agents in the team must effectively coordinate with each other while being robust to the adversary's malicious actions. We model this interaction between the team and the adversary as a stochastic zero-sum game where the team aims to minimize a cost while the adversary aims to maximize it. Under some assumptions on the adversary's capabilities, we characterize a min-max control and communication strategy for the team. We supplement this characterization with several structural results that can make the computation of the min-max strategy more tractable.
