论文标题
攻击树和相关问题的对抗性正式语义
Adversarial Formal Semantics of Attack Trees and Related Problems
论文作者
论文摘要
安全是我们实际社会越来越关注的主题，以保护关键资源免受信息披露，盗窃或损害。 2008年的北约报告中提倡Schneier引入的非正式攻击树模型，并在行业中广泛使用，以控制风险分析中威胁的评估。此后，攻击防御的树木成为许多理论作品的主题，这些著作涉及不同的正式方法。 2017年，M。Audinot等。在攻击树的过渡系统上引入了一种路径语义。受后来的启发，我们提出了对攻击树形式主义的两人解释。为此，我们通过并发游戏领域替换过渡系统，而我们相关的语义包括策略。然后，我们证明空虚的问题（已知是路径语义的NP完整问题）现在已完成。此外，我们表明，在我们的两人解释中，在路径语义中崩溃的p崩溃时，会员问题是综合的。
Security is a subject of increasing attention in our actual society in order to protect critical resources from information disclosure, theft or damage. The informal model of attack trees introduced by Schneier, and widespread in the industry, is advocated in the 2008 NATO report to govern the evaluation of the threat in risk analysis. Attack-defense trees have since been the subject of many theoretical works addressing different formal approaches. In 2017, M. Audinot et al. introduced a path semantics over a transition system for attack trees. Inspired by the later, we propose a two-player interpretation of the attack-tree formalism. To do so, we replace transition systems by concurrent game arenas and our associated semantics consist of strategies. We then show that the emptiness problem, known to be NP-complete for the path semantics, is now PSPACE-complete. Additionally, we show that the membership problem is coNP-complete for our two-player interpretation while it collapses to P in the path semantics.
