论文标题

公平的市场机制设计

Equitable Marketplace Mechanism Design

论文作者

Dwarakanath, Kshama, Vyetrenko, Svitlana S, Balch, Tucker

论文摘要

我们考虑一个交易市场,该市场由具有多种交易策略和目标的交易者所占据。市场允许供应商列出其商品并促进买卖双方之间的匹配。作为回报,这样的市场通常收取促进贸易的费用。这项工作的目的是为市场设计动态的费用时间表,该市场对所有交易者都是公平且有利可图的,同时又能同时向市场盈利(从收费费用)。由于交易者将其策略调整为收费时间表,因此我们提出了一个强化学习框架,用于同时学习市场费用时间表和交易策略,这些策略使用利润和公平性的加权优化目标适应此费用时间表。我们说明了在模拟的证券交易所与不同类型的投资者,特别是营销商和消费者投资者的模拟证券交易所的详细使用。随着我们改变不同投资者类别的公平性权重,我们看到学习的交换费计划开始偏爱权重最高的投资者类别。我们进一步讨论了符合公平市场机制设计的一般框架,从模拟的证券交易所观察到的见解。

We consider a trading marketplace that is populated by traders with diverse trading strategies and objectives. The marketplace allows the suppliers to list their goods and facilitates matching between buyers and sellers. In return, such a marketplace typically charges fees for facilitating trade. The goal of this work is to design a dynamic fee schedule for the marketplace that is equitable and profitable to all traders while being profitable to the marketplace at the same time (from charging fees). Since the traders adapt their strategies to the fee schedule, we present a reinforcement learning framework for simultaneously learning a marketplace fee schedule and trading strategies that adapt to this fee schedule using a weighted optimization objective of profits and equitability. We illustrate the use of the proposed approach in detail on a simulated stock exchange with different types of investors, specifically market makers and consumer investors. As we vary the equitability weights across different investor classes, we see that the learnt exchange fee schedule starts favoring the class of investors with the highest weight. We further discuss the observed insights from the simulated stock exchange in light of the general framework of equitable marketplace mechanism design.

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