论文标题
用得分投票设计战略防止选举系统
Designing Strategyproof Election Systems with Score Voting
论文作者
论文摘要
我们专注于投票系统的战略性型，选民必须在几种可能性中选择多种选择。这些系统包括用于参与式预算的系统，我们在该系统中组织选举，以确定专门用于项目融资的社区预算（城市，地区等）的分配。 我们提出了一个用于研究投票机制和受约束变化属性（CCP）的模型，该模型将用于设计始终具有战略性抗逆转制能力的投票机制。我们还定义了一个新的社会选择功能概念，并使用它来设计一种我们称为得分投票的新型功利主义投票机制。我们证明，具有中性得分功能的核心投票设计的机制相当于在同一实例上进行knapsack投票，并且在其得分函数满足CCP时，使用总分函数设计的任何得分投票均具有策略性范围。 这些结果结合在一起，以设计一种算法，该算法可以找到最接近的总得分功能，从而使任何给定的得分投票都具有策略性。
We focus on the strategyproofness of voting systems where voters must choose a number of options among several possibilities. These systems include those that are used for Participatory Budgeting, where we organize an election to determine the allocation of a community's budget (city, region, etc.) dedicated to the financing of projects. We present a model for studying voting mechanisms and the Constrained Change Property (CCP), which will be used to design voting mechanisms that are always strategyproof. We also define a new notion of social choice function and use it to design a new class of utilitarian voting mechanisms that we call score voting. We prove that the mechanisms designed with core voting with a neutral score function are equivalent to knapsack voting on the same instance and that any score voting designed with a total score function is strategyproof if and only if its score function satisfies CCP. These results are combined to devise an algorithm that can find the closest total score function that makes any given score voting to be strategyproof.
