论文标题
组织有效沟通
Efficient Communication in Organizations
论文作者
论文摘要
本文研究了有偏见的发件人与接收器之间的沟通组织。发件人可以付出一定的代价报告其私人信息。效率是通过在不产生成本的情况下清除信息不对称来实现的。结果表明，只有一种通信协议是有效的，牢固的勾结，并且没有不必要的复杂性。该协议具有简单，对抗性和公共结构。它总是引起有效的平衡，为此提供了封闭形式的表征。这些发现与试图改善决策同时限制浪费影响活动的组织的设计有关。
This paper studies the organization of communication between biased senders and a receiver. Senders can misreport their private information at a cost. Efficiency is achieved by clearing information asymmetries without incurring costs. Results show that only one communication protocol is efficient, robust to collusion, and free from unnecessary complexities. This protocol has a simple, adversarial, and public structure. It always induces efficient equilibria, for which a closed-form characterization is provided. The findings are relevant for the design of organizations that seek to improve decision-making while limiting wasteful influence activities.
