论文标题
通过任意的被动灯源渠道，在BB84诱饵状态协议上窃听联合窃听
Joint eavesdropping on the BB84 decoy state protocol with an arbitrary passive light-source side channel
论文作者
论文摘要
量子密钥分布（QKD）中的被动光源侧通道使量子信号更可区分，因此为窃听者提供了有关量子信号的其他信息。针对迄今已知的被动侧通道的显式窃听策略仅限于被动侧通道的单独测量，此外除了操作自由度。在这里，我们展示了如何考虑操作自由度和通用形式的被动侧渠道的联合窃听。特别是，我们使用信号光子状态的最佳相位互联克隆，这是对无侧向通道的BB84协议的最有效攻击，然后是侧渠道的联合集体测量和自由度的操作程度。为了在此攻击下估算QKD安全性，我们开发了一种有效的错误方法，并将其适用于BB84诱饵州协议。
Passive light-source side channel in quantum key distribution (QKD) makes the quantum signals more distinguishable thus provides additional information about the quantum signal to an eavesdropper. The explicit eavesdropping strategies aimed at the passive side channel known to date were limited to the separate measurement of the passive side channel in addition to the operational degree of freedom. Here we show how to account for the joint eavesdropping on both operational degree of freedom and the passive side channel of the generic form. In particular, we use the optimal phase-covariant cloning of the signal photon state, which is the most effective attack on the BB84 protocol without side channels, followed by a joint collective measurement of the side channel and the operational degree of freedom. To estimate QKD security under this attack, we develop an effective error method and show its applicability to the BB84 decoy-state protocol.
