论文标题
谁控制议程控制政体
Who Controls the Agenda Controls the Polity
论文作者
论文摘要
本文与议程设定者进行了立法决策，该决策者可以依次提出政策，并将每个提案定制为先前投票后盛行的现状。选民很复杂，议程设定者无法致力于她未来的建议。然而，无论最初的默认策略如何，议程设定者都在每个均衡中都获得了她最喜欢的结果。我们结果的核心是一个关于偏好，可操作性的新条件，该条件在富裕的政策空间中，包括空间设置和分配问题。我们的结果推翻了传统观念，即仅选民复杂就限制了议程阶层的权力。
This paper models legislative decision-making with an agenda setter who can propose policies sequentially, tailoring each proposal to the status quo that prevails after prior votes. Voters are sophisticated and the agenda setter cannot commit to her future proposals. Nevertheless, the agenda setter obtains her favorite outcome in every equilibrium regardless of the initial default policy. Central to our results is a new condition on preferences, manipulability, that holds in rich policy spaces, including spatial settings and distribution problems. Our results overturn the conventional wisdom that voter sophistication alone constrains an agenda setter's power.
