论文标题
远视学生的学校选择
School Choice with Farsighted Students
论文作者
论文摘要
我们考虑远视学生基于优先的学校选择问题。我们表明，由从顶部交易周期（TTC）机制获得的匹配组成的单例集是有远见的稳定集。但是，从递延接受（DA）机制获得的匹配可能不属于任何远视稳定集。因此，TTC机制提供了一种不仅有效的帕累托，而且具有远视稳定的任务。此外，期待前方的三个步骤已经足够稳定从TTC获得的匹配。
We consider priority-based school choice problems with farsighted students. We show that a singleton set consisting of the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism is a farsighted stable set. However, the matching obtained from the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism may not belong to any farsighted stable set. Hence, the TTC mechanism provides an assignment that is not only Pareto efficient but also farsightedly stable. Moreover, looking forward three steps ahead is already sufficient for stabilizing the matching obtained from the TTC.
