论文标题
验证共享报价的可引用签名
Quotable Signatures for Authenticating Shared Quotes
论文作者
论文摘要
引用的签名方案是数字签名方案，其附加属性是从消息签名中，任何一方都可以从消息中提取（允许）引号的签名，而无需知道秘密键或与原始消息的签名者进行交互。至关重要的是，提取的签名仍然用原始的秘密键签名。我们使用Merkle树和经典的数字签名方案定义了引用签名方案的安全性概念，并构建了引用签名方案的具体示例。就上述安全性概念而言，该计划被证明是安全的。此外，我们证明了构建方案的复杂性的界限，并提供了签名，引用和验证的算法。最后，考虑了引用签名的具体用例，使用它们来抵抗社交媒体上的真实内容来打击错误信息。我们考虑如何使用引用签名，以及为什么使用它们可以帮助减轻假新闻的影响。
Quotable signature schemes are digital signature schemes with the additional property that from the signature for a message, any party can extract signatures for (allowable) quotes from the message, without knowing the secret key or interacting with the signer of the original message. Crucially, the extracted signatures are still signed with the original secret key. We define a notion of security for quotable signature schemes and construct a concrete example of a quotable signature scheme, using Merkle trees and classical digital signature schemes. The scheme is shown to be secure, with respect to the aforementioned notion of security. Additionally, we prove bounds on the complexity of the constructed scheme and provide algorithms for signing, quoting, and verifying. Finally, concrete use cases of quotable signatures are considered, using them to combat misinformation by bolstering authentic content on social media. We consider both how quotable signatures can be used, and why using them could help mitigate the effects of fake news.
